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Those who work with government development
projects are well aware that many are far from
successful. This is not only true in less developed
countries; there are many failures in the developed
world too, for example in local government pro-jects. But it appears to be a particular problem
with projects financed from foreign aid. This
writer, for example, when challenged finds it
hard to think of more than a handful of projects
financed by Western aid donors that were 'suc-
cessful' in the sense of providing the expected
benefits at approximately the anticipated costs,
without imposing significant unanticipated social
costs on any part of the population.
This paper presents an outline of the negotiations
that led to the acceptance of one particularly bad
project. It is not a 'typical' project, for there is
no such thing. On the other hand many aspects of
this project will not surprise those with experience
of aid-financed projects. It is particularly instruc-
tive for those who are concerned with the nego-
tiation of project agreements; for it brings out
the way in which a well-intentioned donor's wish
not to intrude on the recipient's decision-making
can leave a policy vacuum. In such a situation
commercial or political expediency can easily take
precedence over the economic rationality high-
lighted in project appraisals.
History of the project
In 1965 the Swedish International Development
Agency (SIDA), at the request of the Tanzanian
Government, sent an agronomist to 'examine
the storage and pest problem on the ground, and
to advise us on our requirements'.
His report' was dated May 10, 1966, and when
discussing grain storage and handling it noted that
'very little labour saving (my italics) had been
introduced and that even in the Moshi/Arusha
area bulk handling was seen only as a possibility
for the very distant future'. SIDA suggested to
the Tanzanian Government that it would be
prepared to pay for a more detailed investigation
of grain storage in Tanzania.
I Gesslein, S., 1966, 'Some facts about the Cultivation and
Storage of Grain and Oil Plants in Tanzania' SIDA. May.
The result was the Agriconsult Report2 presented
in early 1967 which stated at the outset that the
purpose of the proposals put forward was to
introduce modern techniques of grain handling
into the country. The report recommended
'modern silos' for Arusha, Dodoma, Iringa and
Dar es Salaam, and, after a brief discussion,
concluded that local storage was not a major
problem and that, for the short periods before
the grain was taken to central stores, tarpaulin
covers and fences could serve as well as godowns,
and at lower cost.
After some pressure from SIDA, the Tanzanian
Government in September 1967 submitted a
formal request for SIDA to finance two of the
four silos in accordance with the consultant's
specifications. SIDA, however, (unexpectedly)
announced that the Agriconsult report was not a
satisfactory document on which to base a project,
and offered Swedish money for another consult-
ancy.
The new consultants, K-Konsult, reported in
December I968. Their terms of reference speci-
fically mentioned that modern silos should form
part of the project, and thus they were not
required to consider whether silos were or were
not the best form of grain storage for Tanzania.
K-Konsult returned in February 1969 and pro-
duced another report4 which recommended addi-
tional facilities and yet more mechanisation at the
silo sites.
The project was signed in July 1969 with the
following items:
4 silos, total capacity 47,000 tons T.Shs.5 22m/-
40 small godowns, total capacity
16,000 tons T.Shs. 4m!-li grade 'A' houses ......... T.Shs. 2m!-
Consultancies and Technical
Assistance T.Shs. Smf-
Unallocated balance ......... T.Shs. 6m/-
2 AGRICONSULT, 1967, 'Survey of Storage and Handling of
Foodgrains and Other Crops in Tanzania', January.
3 K-KONSULT, 1968, 'Foodgrain Storage in Tanzania
December.
4 K-KONSULT, 1969, 'Appendix to Appraisal Report'.
5 One Tanzanian shilling at that time exchanged for 0.14 US
dollars, or 0.059 pound sterling, 7.1 Tanzanian shillings
exchanged for one dollar.
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Total T.Shs. 39m f-
In March 1970, the project was strongly opposed
by the National Agricultural Products Board
(N'APB), the body responsible for implementing
the project:
'In spite of the whole project being considered
flot viable by both the Management and the
Executive Committee of the Board the possi-
bilities of stopping its execution are at present
negligible and what remains is for the Board to
put its reservations on record.'6
NAPBs main objections were as follows:
From NAPB's point of view the project was very
costly. In particular, since the Treasury intended
to charge the NAPIB a semi-commercial rate of
interest on the whole loan, NAPB's storage costs
would rise sharply, and they warned that this
would mean lower prices of maize for the farmers.
(Note: in view of what is said below about the
rate of return of the project, this view must be
regarded as correct.)
would require many highly trained experts and
mechanics to run the equipment, and there could
be problems with spares and maintenance even
then. The project would be a break in NAPB's
tradition of self-reliance.
It would imply too much centralisation of
storage facilities, thereby increasing transport
costs.
'NAPB disagreed with some of the figures of
wastage used by the consultants, and drew atten-
tion to the improvements that could easily be
made to the present system.
These objections by the parastatal supposedly in
charge of the project were never answered.
Detailed planning and design work started. How-
ever, when in late 1970 tenders were called it was
found that they were far in excess of the con-
sultants' figures-100 per cent in excess in the
case of the machinery. K-Konsult had based their
figures on European prices plus transport costs.
The firms involved wanted much more than this.
In conventional terms K-Konsult failed to predict
the prices correctlybut objectively it might be
fairer to blame the system of foreign aid tendering.
When K-Konsult were called back by SIDA in
January 1971 to justify their 'mistake', they
explained that they had not realised that some
prices differed in Tanzania from the Swedish
prices.7 They then proposed to increase the size
of the silos to bring down the unit costs.
6 NAPB, 1970, Executive Committee Paper No. 374/70.
7 K-Consult, 1971, Result of a Mission to Tanzania, l8th-27th
February 1971.'
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After some uncertainty (by this timedetermined
lobbies in both the Swedish and the Tanzanian
camps were questioning the whole project), it was
decided to remove one silo and increase the size
of the other three.
More design work followed, but when more
tenders were called in November 1971 no local
contractor tendered on time, but one local (non-
citizen Asian) contractor tendered late. In order
to allow him to be considered, SIDA insisted on
a retendering, which took place in March 1972.
The contract was then awarded to this contractor.
Economic analysis
As described above, the choice of technique (i.e.
silos, and within the many types of silos that
could have been chosen, concrete silos) was made
in 1967. The 1967 Agriconsult report was rejected
by SIDA, but its conclusion that silos were
economic was built into the terms of reference of
all succeeding reports. T:he cost-benefit analysis
of the 1967 report was, however, criticised by an
economist who worked on the SIDA files in
Stockholm, as well as by economists in the relevant
Tanzanian Ministries.
The most careful analysis was made by the
Swedish economist, who managed to divide the
benefits of the project into those caused by the
silos and those caused by the local godowns. He
concluded:
That using the consultant's own assumptions,
the rate of return on the local godowns was 22
per cent, while the rate of return on the silos was
only 5 per cent.
That if the technical assistance programme and
the senior staff housing (mostly for expatriates)
was included in the cash flow then the rates of
return fell to 14 per cent for the godowns and
1 per cent for the silos.
That making some improvements to the con-
sultant's assumptions about the silos, the rate of
return can be put at 'somewhere less than 5 per
cent'.
The SIDA economist then argued that since
K-Konsult had themselves assumed that the silos
would be used for short-term storage and that
godowns would continue to be used for long-term
storage, there would be few gains from using
silos for long-term storage. This view was con-
firmed by K-Konsult's study of long-term storage
costs in 1971. (op. cit.)
He then considered the side-effects of the pro-
ject, and showed that they were all negative. In
particular he calculated that 400 jobs would be
lost through having bulk handling rather than
sacks and godowns. He recalculated the rate of
return using a shadow wage, and found that it
was just below zero.
These calculations were derived from K-Konsult's
figurers before the cost escalations were known.
1f the cost escalations are included, the rates of
return of the silos fail even more. From these
figures the conclusion is inescapable. The silos
should not have been built, and if more storage
facilities were needed they should have been built
in the form of godowns, whose technology was
simple and well-known. This would have been both
self-reliant and economic.
Why was the project not rejected?
How did the project come to be implemented
when the case against it was so strong?
In the early consultancies SIDA regarded itself
as providing a service to Tanzania in recruiting
consultants, but it regarded these consultants as
Tanzanian consultants and not Swedish ones.
Tanzania, on the other hand, regarded the
consultants as Swedish consultants whose advice
could only be questioned at the risk of upsetting
the Swedes. The consultants were consequently left
with almost complete freedom of action.
In Tanzania there was no-one with professional
knowledge of silos. At the time of the 1968 report
the economists in the Ministry of Agriculture did
not study the K-Konsult report in detail before
it was accepted. When the weaknesses in the
economic analysis were discovered in January
1971 they were not accepted by the senior civil
servants, who argued that the economics must
have been approved earlier.
In addition, various Swedish consultants and ex-
perts failed to produce usable documents. The
Agriconsult report was simply rejected, and the
K-Konsult report was so far out with its figures
that it became discredited. The consultants failed
to adapt to Tanzanian conditions. Admittedly
Sweden had little previous experience in tropical
storage. The 'experts' therefore prescribed the
kind of storage they were accustomed to build in
Sweden. They forgot that the rationale for the
techniques they knew was the shortage of labour
in Sweden and the high wages. When K-Konsult's
engineers realised their freedom they increased
the amount of machinery involved.
On the Tanzanian side the project was dominated
by a philosophy of modernisation. It was thought
that the silos were the latest and most modern
form of storage, and therefore would be appro-
priate for Tanzania in its efforts to catch up in
the technological race. This led to a feeling that
'silos were right' on the part of the Minister of
Agriculture. Since silos were 'modern' it was very
hard for anyone to oppose them, and all sorts of
specious arguments were used (the consultants had
recommended it, it must be right; there had
already been more than enough feasibility studies;
now was the time for action, no more delays; the
silos might not be economic now, but surely one
day they would become so; anddecisively----4he
Swedes would be upset if it was cancelled now).
These arguments were used by people who had
not considered the counter-arguments, or who had
themselves been involved in the initial negotiations
with the Swedes. Many were simply too busy to
welcome another complicated problem.
The opposition to the project from the NAPB was
ignored throughout. It was largely neutralised by
support from another parastatal, the National
Milling Corporation (NMC), which stood to gain
from the silos since they would ease the problems
of feeding their millsthis saving in transport
from godo:wn to mill is one of the few benefits
of the project and under the existing cost structure
it would have accrued to NMC rather than NAPB.
NAPB eventually came to take a fatalistic position
in which they argued that the government had
forced this project on them, and who were they
to dispute it? In a four-page NAPB supplement in
the Dar es Salaam Standard of 23 February 1972
there is not one reference to the silos, but the
following sad comment on storage: 'To date the
Board's total storage capacity of 175,300 tons has
been created with finances solely from its own
domestic saving without having to resort to any
external financial help. This is in line with our
policy of self-reliance.'
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